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The relationship between the type of political regime and foreign direct investments 
has been widely studied. The large number of studies have explored different elements of 
the FDI and regime type link, but little consensus has emerged on the overall relationship. 
In this paper I conduct the first elite level experiment of how political regimes shape 
investment decisions. By using an original sample of investment analysts from one of the 
top investment firms in the world I find that the political regime has a significant and 
substantive effect on investor decisions on whether or not to invest on a foreign country. 
This finding is robust under varying levels of property rights, capital controls, judicial 
independence, and economic conditions. I also find that the effect of political regimes is 
strengthened when the protection of property rights fall. This indicates that regime type 
plays an instrumental role in investors’ decision making process. The results point towards 
a need to better understand why political regimes matter to attract investment flows.  
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1. Introduction  
Previous work on the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and 
political regimes have either tested specific mechanisms such as the impact of democracy 
on political risk, or have revolved around empirical analysis of aggregate FDI stocks and 
flows. While these former studies have allowed us to understand the causal impact of 
regimes on some of the mechanisms linking democracy and FDI, the later studies have 
failed to come to a consensus on how important political regimes are to the aggregate 
relationship.  To address this issue I implement an experiment on a sample of investment 
analysts. The sample is composed of subjects that work at one of the top ten investment 
firms in the world. Each subject handles, on average, funds worth fifty billion dollars, and 
makes investment assessments, both at a national and international level, with regularity. 
The study is unique in having access to experiment on such an elite and relevant sample. 
Focusing on elites making cross-national investment decisions leads to a high degree of 
external validity for this study, and the experimental research designs holds a strong degree 
of internal validity. I find that political regimes influence FDI flows, and that its effect is 
strengthened by weak property rights in recipient countries.   
For the experiment, I use a conjoint analysis to tease out the effect of democracies 
on the decision making process of individual investors. Conjoint experiments have been 
more common in the field of marketing, but they have gained popularity in political 
science. They are particularly well suited for this study because they allow one to 
randomize across several attributes without needing an exceedingly large sample to do 
inferential analysis. After randomizing across attributes and individuals, it is 
straightforward to obtain the unconditional effect of any one attribute on the decision 
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making process of the subject pool. For example, I estimate the unconditional effect of the 
political regime on investment decisions. I also estimate the unconditional effect of 
property rights on investment decisions. In other words, I isolate the effect of political 
regimes from associated mechanisms that are believed to carry the blunt of the variable’s 
explanatory power. This allows me to establish a causal relation between regime type and 
FDI flows, while taking into account mechanisms that could potentially muddle up the 
connection.  
There are strong theoretical arguments both in favor and against the positive 
relation between FDI and political regimes without clear theoretical predictions on the 
overall impact. Using an experimental approach, I find that political regimes have a strong 
unconditional effect on investment decisions. Investors care about the political regime 
more than they care about capital controls or the existence of BITs in recipient countries. 
In addition, contrary to what empirical analysis has found, regime type weights as much as 
property rights in the decision-making process of investors. This result helps adjudicate the 
debate on whether regime type is a determinant of FDI flows or not. I also find that the 
effect of regime type is strengthened in low property rights contexts. This indicates that 
investors use political regimes in an instrumental way to maximize the expected return of 
the investment.  
The findings have important implications for the field. By using an experiment I 
make a strong case for the causal relationship between FDI flows and political regimes. 
This speaks directly to the branch of the field that has found evidence in the same line of 
thought. More broadly, it hints at a need to once again bring political regimes to the 
forefront of the study of FDI determinants. However, it also suggests that investors use 
political regimes in an instrumental way. Work must be done to understand what elements 
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of regimes, besides the usual suspects, account for this effect. Rather than a call to go back 
to the analysis of aggregate accounts, this points towards a greater need to use fine-grained 
data to test our hypothesis. This goes in line with the conclusions reached by Pandya 
(2016).  
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents an overview on the theory on 
how regime types and FDI flows are related; section 3 presents the research design; section 





2. Political regimes and FDI flows: an uncertain relationship 
There are many reasons to believe that regime type influences investment decisions. At the 
most fundamental level, democracies are believed to possess institutions highly valued by 
investors. For example, Barro (1996) attributes the positive effect that democracies have 
on growth on the rule of law, among other factors. In the same vein, regime type is thought 
to have a direct effect on FDI flows. Democratic governments have more constraints and 
are subject to domestic audience costs, which should make their commitments more 
credible. In addition, it could be argued that democracies have a freer (and thus 
competitive) labor market, are ideologically closer to the country of origin of investors, 
and present lower levels of political uncertainty. Then, it is unsurprising that many studies 
have shown that political regimes have an effect on FDI flows, even after controlling for 
rule of law1.  
Nevertheless, the main theoretical candidate to explain why democracies should 
affect FDI flows remains the rule of law and how this protects the private property of 
foreign investors. Setting bilateral investment treaties (BITs) aside, there is no formal way 
to settle conflicts that arise between foreign investors and host countries at an international 
level (Jensen et al 2012). Thus, if presented with two countries, identical in all but their 
respect for private property, investors will choose the one with a higher level of property 
rights. The only way a country with low level of property rights would be selected is if it 
offered a higher rate of return. In other words, the price of investment is higher, which 
lowers the aggregate level of FDI a country would receive. From a rational point of view, 
                                                 
1 For excellent examples see Jensen (2003), Jensen (2008), Pandya (2014), or Kerner (2014).  
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the existence of property rights should weight more than concerns about ideology, labor 
quality, or political uncertainty in the minds of investors. Li and Resnick (2003) not only 
find that, indeed, property rights matter, but, that once they are accounted for, political 
regimes play no role in investment decisions. This conclusion, surprising when contrasted 
with the previous discussion, has been found in other studies2.  
The findings of Li and Resnick pushed the field towards thinking of other 
intermediating mechanisms that can account for the effect of political regimes. For 
example, democracies may offer more economic freedoms than autocracies. Lower tax 
rates, ease of doing business, and freedom of capital movement can all be considered as 
important for investors3. Others have turned their attention to BITs and their role of 
isolating investment risks from national courts. As democracies are more likely to sign this 
type of agreement, they will attract higher levels of investment (Neumayer and Spess 
2005)4. Other possible mechanisms are the level of corruption, respect for human rights, 
and close relations with other democracies, among others. To further muddle up findings 
on the topic, there is evidence that political regimes continue to matter even after 
controlling for all of these intermediating mechanisms (Biglaiser and Staats 2010). 
The increased attention to mechanisms naturally leads to intermediating variables 
that have a negative effect on FDI flows. Democracies may have strict anti-trust 
regulations, favor domestic firms over international firms, yield more frequently to popular 
pressure, have less generous tax incentives, and in some cases offer less economic 
                                                 
2 Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) find the same results for Latin America, and Ali, Fiess, and MacDonald 
(2010) reach a similar conclusion when analyzing investment data at a sectorial level. 
3 See Baccini, Li, and Merkina (2014), Corcoran and Gillanders (2015), and Asiedu and Lien (2004) for 
discussions on each element respectively. 




freedoms (Li, Mitchell, and Owen 2017)5.This line of reasoning brings theories on how 
regime type affects FDI flows full circle. Now it is argued that autocrats can commit with 
more credibility than democracies, and thus enjoy higher levels of foreign investment. The 
question becomes whether, on the net, the effect becomes negative or positive. As has been 
previously discussed, there is evidence that the effect is positive. But there is also evidence 
that the aggregate effect is negative6. And, it has also been argued that there is no aggregate 
effect (Montero 2008) or that it depends on the sector (Douglas and Jepsen 2014). Clearly 
then, the views on how regime type and FDI flows interact are not clear.  
Researchers have tried to disentangle this web by using advanced statistical analysis 
and exploiting novel sources of data. However, regime type and its intermediating 
mechanisms are hard concepts to measure, and somewhat surprisingly, so are FDI flows. 
It has been shown that how FDI is measured has a strong effect on the relationship it has 
with regime type (Kerner 2014)7. FDI flows can be measured as a yearly change, a stock, 
a ratio with respect to production, and a level variable. It can also vary on what is 
understood as FDI, for example, are re-invested utilities part of the FDI flow or are they 
conceptually different? The selection of the dependent variable can have implications on 
the consistency of the results on the topic. Analysis has also turned towards the use of 
lagged values of the independent and dependent variables to better understand the 
dynamics of the relation. However, lagged dependent variables can bias the results (Achen 
2000) while lagged independent variables do not necessarily lead to clean cut causality 
(Bellemare, Massaki, and Pepinsky 2015).  
                                                 
5 Also see Manthur and Sing (2013), Li and Resnick (2003), Zcheng (2011), and O’Donnel (1998) for more 
detailed discussions on these factors.   
6 See Tuman et al (2004) or Mathur and Singh (2013) 
7 Doulglas and Jepsen (2014) find similar issues with how investment is measured in the model. 
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Novel methods of causal inference can complement this rich body of research. 
Baccini, Li and Mirkina (2016) appear to move in this direction by using synthetic controls 
to evaluate the impact of tax controls on FDI flows. This kind of controlled exercises may 
have a lower degree of external validity, but make a strong case for adjudicating hard to 
answer cases, such as the present one. In this paper I implement an experiment to tease out 
the relationship between political regimes and investment decisions. This type of analysis 
is not only novel, it also complements past and ongoing work on the topic.  
By isolating the regime type from institutions that serve as intervening mechanisms, 
we can analyze if the regime itself matters or not. Three possible situations present 
themselves. On one hand, the effect may be undistinguishable from zero. This may happen 
either because the regime type does not matter, or because its positive and negative effects 
cancel each other. This result would be the least analytical useful of the three. Alternatively, 
it can be found that there is a relation between democratic regimes and FDI flows. This 
finding would lead future research towards analyzing why the effect is positive or negative. 
Finally, since most intervening mechanisms are theorized to have a positive effect, the 
isolated regime will carry only its own weight and whatever negative unobservable 
mechanisms there are. Thus, if the effect is positive, it means that it is strong enough to 
counter the negative pull of other factors. In that case, it becomes important to understand 
whether the positive effect is due to ideological diffusion patterns or due to more immediate 
advantages granted by the regime type.  
Ideological patterns refer to the notion that ideas matter when explaining patterns 
of globalization (Quinn and Toyoda 2007). Investors may be attracted to democratic ideals 
such as the respect for human and civil rights. This may be due to a purely ideological 
reasoning, or as a response to pressures from the popular base in their own domestic 
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markets. Alternatively, a democratic regime may provide more concrete advantages to 
foreign investors. Democracies have more constraints which would translate to a more 
stable investment environment. Similarly, they present more access points to influence 
policy for international investors. Under this second line of thought, the isolated effect of 
regime types is due to instrumental profit oriented reasons. 
An indirect way of testing which of these holds is by observing how investors act 
under different regime types when property rights are also changing. If investors care about 
the ideological fundamentals of regime types, investment flows towards democracies 
should exceed that of autocracies, no matter the level of property rights in a country. 
Alternatively, if regime type holds instrumental value for investors, there should be 
variation across both the level of property rights and regime type. If property rights are 
high, and the ideological fundamentals of democracies do not matter, investment flows 
should not vary between autocracies and democracies. Following the same line of thought, 
when property rights are low, democracies should receive higher levels of investment, 
since investors would turn to regime type as a way of safeguarding their investment. This 
could take the shape a more stable economic environment or more access points to 
influence policy, for example. 
Given the previous discussion, I the aim to test two hypotheses: 
1.  Investors will be more attracted to a country when said country operate under a 
democratic regime. 
2. The effect of the political regime will be stronger when property rights are low in a 
country.  
The first hypothesis deals with the isolated effect of political regimes on investment 
decisions. By using an experimental design I isolate the regime type from many of the 
9 
 
common intervening mechanisms considered in the field. The second hypothesis is an 
indirect test of the mechanism through which these effect takes place. Using an interaction 
between the effect of property rights and political regime, I look to determine if democratic 
regimes matter due to ideological reasons or instrumental ones. I have no prior reasoning 
to believe that investors will cease to be profit driven entities, so I expect that the effect of 
the regime type will increase under low property rights conditions, indicating an 





3. Research Design8 
As was previously discussed, it has been hard to properly establish the relation between 
FDI flows and its determinants. I use an experiment on a new sample of experts to address 
this issue. The sample is composed of investment analysts from one of the ten biggest 
investment firms in the world. The firm has operations across the globe and the analysts 
make investment analysis and decisions as part of their daily operations. Each subject in 
the sample handles, on average, funds worth fifty billion dollars9. These funds are invested 
across sectors and across countries. Such a sample is ideal to study how international 
investors make decisions. By using an experiment I extract information about the 
investment decision making process from the subjects, without compromising 
confidentiality, all while controlling for potential biases in their responses.  
Note that traditional experiments usually test only for one or two variables. Testing 
for more factors requires a larger sample than what researchers usually have at their 
disposal. However, the particular nature of the research question asks for a test of several 
attributes at the same time, while the sample is limited in size. Due to these issues, conjoint 
analysis presents an attractive alternative. Rather than vary the treatment per subject, in a 
conjoint design all subjects are presented with choice tasks where attributes vary per 
question. This allows researchers to test for several attributes simultaneously without 
needing an exceedingly large sample.  
                                                 
8 This study was exempted from IRB approval on October 10, 2016 under study number 2016-09-0128 by 
the Institutional Review Board of the University of Texas at Austin.  
9 Interview April 18, 2017.  
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Furthermore, since the value of each variable is randomized per question and per 
subject, the estimated effect is independent of the value of the other variables (Hainmueller 
at al, 2014). This is important to test whether political regimes matter for FDI flows. An 
experiment where only the regime type is randomized will be criticized for its low level of 
generalizability, since it would not account for the different scenarios under which a regime 
interacts with investment decisions. In addition, it would not help answer whether regime 
type has an effect in isolation of property rights and other institutions. In other words, by 
using a conjoint analysis it is possible to estimate the effect of the political regime 
conditioning on the distribution of the institutions and environmental factors that might 
muddle up any potential conclusion.  
Conjoint analysis consists of asking respondents to choose among several 
alternatives. Each alternative is characterized by attributes that take random variables 
across choices, questions, and subjects. Following the discussion in section 2, I presented 
subjects with hypothetical countries (choices) characterized by their economic freedoms, 
level of property rights, whether they have signed a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), and 
regime type. All these are traits commonly taken as intermediating mechanisms through 
which democracies affect FDI flows. To further increase the validity of the task, countries 
are also characterized by their economic conditions.  
In particular, economic freedom is represented by the level of capital controls, 
economic conditions by expected growth and inflation rates, and the political regime by 
the classification used by Freedom House (2013). The level of property rights is 
represented by hypothetical categorical values of low, medium, and high. Note that, as in 
any experiment, the treatment is limited by the subject’s attention span and the sample size. 
While it would be more realistic to include more attributes, it is advised no to do so to 
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minimize the risk of the subject losing interest halfway through the treatment (Orme 2005). 
Similarly, an attribute cannot take on too many values without running into statistical 
inference issues. Thus, while a complex variable such as economic freedoms would be 
better represented by several complex attributes, the level of capital controls is a good 
enough proxy within the limitations of the experiment.  
Having said that, the values for the variables were not picked without forethought. 
Having a BIT or not, and having being sued through the BIT or not, address the debate on 
if, and when, BITs matter.10 The inflation rates picked, 2%, 7%, and 10% are values that 
can be considered low, moderate, and high rates in the context of a developing country. A 
value of 10% is equivalent to double digit inflation, which raises the specter of hyper-
inflation in people’s minds11. A value of 2% is equivalent to the rate the US usually aims 
for, and a value of 7% is close to the average inflation rate the IMF reports for developing 
countries for the decade 2000-2010 (IMF 2016). The same logic applies to an economic 
growth rate of 1%, 3%, and 6%. In the last decade, the lowest growth rate for emerging 
markets was around 1% (crisis year), while the highest growth years oscillated between 
6% and 7% (Didier 2016). For political regime I use the “not free”, “partly free”, and “free” 
categories from Freedom House. While much more fine grained and subtle measures 
abound in the field, interviews with subjects indicate they use simple aggregate measures 
of democracy for their judgment calls12. For the level of property rights I use “low”, “mid”, 
and “high” categories. This is a simplification of the World Bank’s measure of property 
rights index that goes from 1 (weak) to 6 (strong). While I could have used the measure 
                                                 
10 See Hallward-Driemeier (2003) or Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2011). 
11 This measure is so common to describe high inflation that it even has its own entry in the Cambridge 
Dictionary and is commonly used in news articles with negative connotation. For example see Gladstone 
(2013) on Iran’s inflationary woes or Ant (2017) on Turkey’s efforts to curb double-digit inflation.  
12 Interview on April 18, 2017. 
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itself, I would have risked subjects not being familiar with what the index entails or how 
to interpret it. Finally, for capital controls I once again use “low”, “mid”, and “high”. Most 
capital control indices are complex in nature. Miller and Kim (2015) attempt to create 
subjective categories, but it is not clear that investors would be familiar with their measure 
or agree with the categorization. Considering that, it is better to leave the interpretation of 
what each value entails open to subjects. Given that this is their area of expertise, and they 
work in the same company, the prompt more than likely will make them default to priors 
on what a given level of control looks like.  
Two further benefits of using conjoint analysis are that it allows for a direct 
comparison across the importance of each attribute, as well as the creation of interaction 
effects between any attributes that are chosen. The former is important because it helps in 
identifying how important, in substantive terms, the political regime is. A significant effect 
that is barely different than zero would not be as interesting as a significant effect that has 
a strong influence on investor’s decisions. The latter is important because it helps test how 
the effect of regime type changes when other attributes move. For example, regime type 
might have a weak effect by itself, but it might become important when property rights are 
low.  
It is also important to notice that conjoint analysis is adequate when moving several 
variables while having only a small sample size. According to Johnson and Orme (1996), 
doubling the number of tasks per subject is about as effective in increasing precision as 
doubling the number of respondents. In theory, a person responding a thousand choice 
tasks would be equivalent to a thousand persons responding one choice task each.  In 
practice, they find that subjects can solve at least twenty choice tasks without introducing 
any degradation of data quality into the study.  
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Based on this, several rules of thumb have been proposed to determine what an 
adequate sample size for a conjoint experiment is.13 Note, however, that highly specialized 
populations are more homogenous and prone to present less variance in their opinions. 
Furthermore, they may follow logical paths to their decision making, leading to consistent 
choices. As such, the sample size necessary to be able to infer results from them does not 
need to be as big as it would be when dealing with a general population. With this in mind,  
Tang et al. (2006) propose a Logical Consistency Index (HLI) that takes into account 





≥ 𝐻𝐿𝐼 (1) 
 
In the equation “n” is the sample size, “t” is the number of tasks per respondent, 
“a” is the number of alternatives per task, and “d.f.” is the number of coefficients estimated 
in the model. The denominator accounts for the complexity of the model being estimated 
and punishes the addition of alternatives to inflate the HLI. The authors propose a value of 
100 for the HLI when dealing with specialists. In other words, if the left hand side of the 
equation is greater than or equal to 100, the sample size, “n”, is adequate enough for the 
exercise.   
For this study, the sample consists of 28 highly specialized subjects out of a 
potential population at the financial advisory team of 50 (N)14. Each of them answered 15 
                                                 
13 Orme (1998) originally proposed a similar rule of thumb where the HLI equivalent has to be over 500. 
While still in use, it is too strict when dealing with samples of specialists. Since specialist populations are 
smaller in number, and with lower variance in opinions, it has been argued that a smaller HLI would suffice 
to study them.  
14 Interview April 23, 2017. 
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choice tasks (t)15, with a number of alternatives per choice task equal to 3 (a). In total, 12 
coefficients are estimated for the attributes being tested (d.f.). Altogether, this gives an HLI 
of 105. This value is higher than the lower HLI bound suggested for conjoint exercises on 
highly specialized samples.  
The conjoint exercise was applied through an online tool (Qualtrics). Subjects 
lacked schedule flexibility to do the experiment in one in-house round. The use of an online 
tool allowed them to take the experiment according to their availability. Given the small 
subject pool, it was necessary to prioritize responsiveness over sterile control of the 
environment. At the start of the experiment respondents where prompted with the following 
message:  
 
The following exercise aims to determine what are the main 
drivers of investment flows among specialists such as yourself. The 
survey consists of 15 questions where you must pick a country to invest 
in, and 4 short demographic questions.  
For the exercise assume that you have narrowed the place to 
set up a new manufacturing plant down to three developing countries 
(Country 1, Country 2, and Country 3). For each question, please 
select the hypothetical country profile that is more attractive for you 
to invest in by building the new manufacturing plant. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Less than the maximum of 20 that Johnson and Orme (1996) estimate subjects can reliable answer 
before their responses give a net loss of information to the study.  
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Figure 1: Example of survey choice task 
 
To avoid priming subjects with prior knowledge of a country or region, I obviate 
giving proper names on the experiment’s prompt. Otherwise, there is a risk of biasing 
responses with a subject’s prior belief of a particular state or region. Characterizing the 
investment decision as a new manufacturing plant was also done on purpose. Leaving FDI 
as a generic term may open the concept for different interpretations, such as utility 
reinvestments, buy-in on existing business (M&A), or the acquisition of easily divestible 
assets. A new manufacturing plant is a fixed asset that is not easily sellable and represents 
a strong commitment on the investor’s part. Furthermore, by being new, the investment is 
green. Kerner (2014) argues that empirical work with FDI measures will give different 
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results depending on how FDI is conceptualized. By limiting the exercised to a visible 
green field investment I aim to circumvent the issue altogether.  
Subjects were then presented with a table containing attribute information for three 
different hypothetical countries. Subjects were asked to select the country where they 
would set up the new manufacturing plant, given the information provided. Figure 1 
provides an example on how such a choice task looks.  
Respondents were asked a similar choice task fifteen times each. Each choice task 
presented three different profiles with random attribute values. The order in which they 
appear in the choice task was also randomized by respondent. By randomizing the order in 
which they appear I control for possible biases induced by the subject preferring the first 
positioned attributes, for example, to shape their decision. In spite of this, I present 
robustness checks to ensure the randomization worked and that ordering is not biasing the 
results in the appendix.  
Experiments by their nature can be affected by interference, attrition and non-
compliance. Given the nature of survey experiments, attrition is not of much concern in 
this case. In addition, due to the small sample size, I was able to monitor when a survey 
was carried to completion or not. Since there is no control group per se, non-compliance is 
also not a major issue. There is no risk of the control taking the treatment or vice-versa. 
However, there is a risk in subjects talking with each other or influencing what they are 
doing. Given the limited access that was given to the subjects, I was not able to do a close 
follow-up of their interactions. However, many of the responses come from different ip-
addresses, meaning they responded at home in some instances. Similarly, responses were 
spread throughout weeks. In addition, short unstructured interviews to a sub sample of 
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subjects further assuages my concerns about interference16. During the interviews they 
revealed they had not shared or discussed the experiment with other office-mates. The high 
pressure environment in which they work keeps non-essential activities, such as the survey, 
off the discussion table throughout the day.  
The results are analyzed by estimating the average marginal component effects 
(AMCE) for each attribute. This gives the effect of an attribute conditional on the 
distribution of the values of other attributes. In other words, it gives the marginal effect 
that a political regime has on investment decisions. Average component interaction effects 
(ACIE) are also estimated for the attributes under analysis. An ACIE is the equivalent of 
an interaction effect in normal regression analysis. It will elucidate whether attributes 
interact in interesting and unexpected ways. Given the nature of the research question this 
proves to be valuable. For example, an ACIE is necessary to determine if the effect of 
regime type changes as the effect of property rights does the same.  
  
                                                 
16 Interviews on January 4, 2017.  
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4. Sample and results 
As previously mentioned the study was conducted on a sample of investment analysts. All 
subjects in the sample work at the headquarters of one of the top 10 investment firms in 
the world and deal frequently with international investment and private equity operations. 
The subjects routinely analyze financial, macroeconomic, and political data to make 
investment recommendations for the firm and its clients. The average size of the fund they 
manage is fifty billion US dollars. While they do not make the final decision (that is 
reserved for people higher in the organization), their technical operations carry 
considerable weight in the final deciding process and are rarely overturned.  
In regards to its composition, the sample is made of finance majors (50%), 
economics majors (25%), and mathematicians (14%). The rest is composed of computer 
scientists, statisticians, engineers, and business majors (one of each).  By origin, 32% of 
the subjects are from the US, 25% from China, and 14% from India. Other countries 
represented by the sample include Germany, Korea, Italy, Latvia, and Switzerland. Finally, 
the average age of the sample is 26 years and 54% of the subjects are male. The oldest 
person on the sample is 32 years old while the youngest one is 22 years old. In general, the 
sample is composed by analysts and associates at the firm. While the subject’s age may 
seem low, this is standard for the industry and does not imply lesser responsibilities.17 The 
size of the funds they manage is evidence of the sample’s relevance.  
A conjoint experimental design18 achieves causal inference by estimating the 
average marginal component effect (AMCE). The AMCE identifies the marginal effect of 
                                                 
17 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017)  53% of employees in “securities, commodities, 
funds, trusts, and other financial investments” are under 42 years old with the average being around 35 
years old (own estimate). Note that this includes all senior employees, associates are bound to be younger 
on average.   
18 This section makes liberal use of Hainmueller et al. (2014) throughout the analysis. 
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attribute “i” averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes. In different 
words, it represents the average effect of an attribute on the probability of a profile being 
chosen over another. For instance, in this case the AMCE of economic growth represents 
the average change in the probability of a country being chosen over another caused by 
changes in the growth attribute. The advantage of using the AMCE over the average 
treatment effect (ATE) is that it is conditional on the distribution of other attributes. Note 
that this implies that the AMCE is adjusted according to the probability distribution of all 
attributes. Once again using growth as an example, this means that the effect takes into 
account the value of the other attributes given to the subject, including the slanted 
probability distribution of having been sued through a BIT. This gives the experiment a 
higher degree of external validity and permits the comparison of AMCEs across attributes. 
Figure 2 summarizes the results of the exercise. The coefficients for all variables 
are in the expected direction. Having no capital controls increases investment flows19, a 
positive economic outlook is attractive for investors, while price volatility scares them 
away. BITs have a positive non-significant effect, and property rights has a positive effect 
on investment outcomes. Finally, political regime has a direct effect on investment flows. 
In particular, the less democratic a country is, the less likely it is to be favored by investors.  
Note that the interpretation of AMCE coefficients is straightforward. In the case of 
political regimes the results indicate that a not-free country is -0.14 (S.E. of 0.03) points 
less likely than a free country to receive investment. Similarly, a partly free country is 0.09 
(S.E. 0.03) points less likely than a free country to be favored by investors. The conjoint 
analysis also allows for direct comparisons across attributes. Figure 2 clearly shows that 
                                                 
19 The coefficients for capital controls are not significant. In many ways capital controls are as 
controversial as the political regime in the field. Rodrick (1998) warned of how their effect is contextual, 
and recently even the IMF, Korineck (2011) advocates for a healthy level of controls.  
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the effect size of political regimes is, on average, similar to the effect size of property rights 
(Coefficients of 0.15 and 0.1 for the presented categories). This is significant because it 
signals that the effect of the regime is as substantively important as that of political regimes.  
Figure 2: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for the experiment 
 
Note: Average marginal component effects for each attribute in the experiment. The baselines are selected for ease of 
interpretation. I present 95% confidence intervals estimated with clustered standard errors. A positive estimate indicates 
an increase in the probability, in the value of the estimate, that an investment will be made.  
A more direct measure of the same result can be found following Orme (2005). 
According to Orme, the relative importance of each attribute can be estimated by 
considering how much difference each attribute could make in the total utility of a product. 
This is obtained by measuring the distance between the high point and low point of an 
attribute, then taking its relative weight compared to the distance for other attributes. Figure 
3 presents the results for this exercise. Economic factors are clearly the most important 
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deciding element20, but notice that both property rights and political regime come in second 
with roughly the same contribution (around 15% each).  
Figure 3: Importance of each attribute on investment decisions 
 
Note: Relative importance of each attribute in the decision making process of investors. Following Orme (2005) the 
importance is obtained by obtaining the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the coefficients for 
each attribute (min-max difference), summing all min-max differences, then estimating the weight of each attribute 
difference in the summation.  
These results confirm hypothesis 1. Political regimes do influence the decision 
making processes of investors. Furthermore, this effect is in isolation of institutions that 
are thought to usually absorb said effect. That indicates that investors are responding to an 
attribute of democracies in isolation of property rights, economic freedoms, BITs, or 
                                                 
20 While not the focus of the study, this result is important. Work done on the field tends to undervalue the 
contribution of economic factors and fail to question when its coefficient is not significant or barely higher 
than 0 in empirical results. While political factors are important, it would be incorrect to pretend that they 
overrule economic factors in a predominantly economic decision.  
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economic performance. Said attribute can range from ideological preferences based on a 
respect for human rights to more pressing instrumental reasons, such as being able to 
influence policy through several channels.  
The use of average component interaction effects (ACIE) can shed light on the issue 
and give a more subtle response on when political regimes matter. For that matter Figure 
4 presents the ACIE between all attributes and property rights. Note that the baseline values 
for each attribute are not equal to the baseline values for Figure 1. The change is done to 
increase the distance between levels of variables. For example, property rights go from low 
to high instead of medium to high. An identical baseline change was done to level of 
democracy. This change is done only to facilitate understanding, it has no substantive effect 
on the estimates. Since the number of subjects inside each category is smaller, the standard 
errors go up. By setting up the baseline to be the middle value for each attribute I simply 
am maximizing the difference between the coefficients presented in the figure. This does 
not involve any change in the methodology, data, or results, it simply is an artifice for 
visual representation of the results. In any case, the appendix contains the same plot using 
the old baselines, and the results hold.  
Going back to figure 4, focusing first on the estimates for democracy, note how the 
values lose significance when the level of property rights is high (the left figure). On the 
other hand, when the level of property rights is low (the right figure), a regime classified 
as free continues to have a positive and statistical effect on investment decisions. This result 
is impressive when the increased size of the standard errors are taken into account. While 
all other variables lose statistical significance when estimating the ACIE, the substantive 
effect of level of democracy is strong enough to remain significant. This signals that 
24 
 
investors put a lot of weight on information gleaned from regime type when there is little 
protection for property rights.  
Figure 4: Average Component Interaction Effects (ACIE) with Property Rights 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals estimated with clustered standard errors. The ACIE gives the estimate of the effect of 
an attributed on the probability of investment in the presence of a different attribute. In this case, it shows the effect of 
all attributes in the presence of varying levels of property rights.  
The ACIEs for expected growth, expected inflation, having a BIT, and capital 
control do not produce similar results. In part, this is due to the increased standard errors. 
On the other hand, if regime matters when a firm is facing adverse circumstances, it will 
do so when the regime type signifies a potential change for the firm. For example, if 
property rights are low, having access to several levels of government can counteract the 
environment in an informal way. The same cannot be said for economic expectations. Even 
if pressured, there is little a government can do in the short term to alter their path. Finally, 
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both capital controls and BITs are not significant in the unconditional estimates, so there 
is little reason for them to be significant in interaction, given the widened standard errors.  
These results serve as evidence for hypothesis 2. If investors cared about the 
political regime for ideological reasons, its effect should not vary according to the level of 
property rights. Instead, not only does the effect of regime type vary according to the level 
of property rights, it is strengthened by low levels of protection. When the investment is 
uncertain, investors increase their reliance on the regime type as a source of stability. 
Democracies have more constrains and should lead to more stable environments. 
Furthermore, they present more access points for investors to influence policy making and 
protect their assets through informal means. This speaks to an instrumental reasoning for 
why investors consider political regimes in their decision making. While Quinn and 
Toyoda (2007) speak of ideology as an important factor for why investors should care 
about the level of democratization in a country, the evidence of this experiment says 
otherwise. Investors are profit driven and make their decisions based on a utility 





In this paper, I circumvent empirical issues to address the debate on the role of political 
regimes in investment decisions. In particular, I use an experiment in the form of a conjoint 
analysis to isolate the effect of common intervening mechanisms and of the political regime 
itself. To assure that the answer holds an acceptable degree of external validity I applied 
the experiment on an original sample of investment analysts. The analysts work for one of 
the ten biggest investment firms in the world and make foreign investment decisions as 
part of their daily operations. They manage funds that average fifty billion dollars and 
direct them to investment alternatives across the world. This is the first experiment of this 
nature that has been carried on such a sample.  
I find that the regime type of a country does influence investment decisions. The 
findings are robust under varying levels of property rights, capital controls, and economic 
conditions. In addition, due to the stochastic nature of the experiment, its results can be 
interpreted in a causal way. Furthermore, the results indicate that the substantive effect of 
regime type is equivalent to that of property rights. This helps settle the debate on whether 
democracies matter by showing that not only do they matter, but that they matter as much 
as property rights, an intervening mechanism long argued to explain any positive effects 
attributed to regimes. 
In addition, I find that this effect is strengthened when property rights are low in a 
country. This is an indicator that firms care about regime type for instrumental reasons, 
rather than ideological beliefs. It is possible that democracies offer more access points to 
influence policy, or a higher degree of political stability that plays a role in investors profit 
calculations. Note, however, that this is not concrete evidence, future research should aim 
to understand if and why democracies affect the utility of foreign investors.  
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The study’s main contribution is to complement previous work by overcoming 
confounding obstacles that have existed in empirical research. Going forward, it can guide 
future empirical and experimental research on the topic at hand. For example, it suggests 
that the field should take a second look at the role that regime type plays in investment 
decisions. It also calls for a better understanding on how investors use regime type as a 
shortcut to maximize utilities. While property rights matter, regime type has an effect of 
its own. This can be studied by analyzing new disaggregate series on FDI flows, as has 
already been suggested by Pandya (2016) when it comes to work on the politics of FDI in 







In this section I test assumptions that are implicit in any conjoint analysis. In particular, 
causal inference based on conjoint analysis relies on three assumptions. The first of this is 
called the no carryover effects assumption. This assumption requires that potential 
outcomes always take on the same values as long as all the profiles in the same choice task 
have identical set attributes. In other words, this assumption implies that a subject's 
response to a choice task will not be influence by profiles that were presented in previous 
choice tasks or by profiles that will be presented in future choice tasks. 
A way of testing if this assumption holds involves assessing if results from later 
tasks differ from results obtained in the first task. Figure 5 presents the ACME for four 
subsets of the data: the first, the fifth, the tenth, and the fifteenth choice task. For example, 
subfigure “Task 1” is estimated using only the first response from each subject, while 
subfigure “Task 15” is estimated using only their last response. As can be seen most of the 
attributes hold similar values to each other and to that of the estimation for the pooled data. 
Note however that each plot is done using only one answer from each subject, so the 
estimates are based on 28 data points. This has increased the standard errors of each 
estimate and explains why some estimators (democracy for example) appear to vary more 
than the others. Nevertheless, the test supports the “no carryover” assumption necessary to 
establish causality from conjoint analysis.  
The second assumption refers to profile order effects. This assumptions requires 
subjects to ignore the order in which profiles are presented in a choice task. If, for example, 
subjects always picked the first profile, the results would be biased. This assumption can 
be tested by verifying if the AMCE is similar no matter on which profile the assumptions 
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take place. This is equivalent to estimating the AMCE for a subset of data for each profile 
position. Figure 6 shows the AMCE for each profile of data. As can be seen, except for 
BITs and been sued (related categories) the estimates are similar. 
Figure 5: Testing carryover effects 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals estimated with clustered standard errors. If the results for each task are similar to each 
other the “no carryover” effect assumption is not violated.  
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Figure 6: Testing profile order effects 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals estimated with clustered standard errors. Suspicions of profile effects arise when the estimates across profiles differ from each other. In 




The third and final assumption is that profiles were assigned at random. This 
assumption holds by design. As previously explained every element of the survey was 
randomized before giving it to a subject. Nevertheless, this assumption was tested by 
checking whether the attributes can predict individual covariates such as sex or age. In both 
instances the attributes are not statistically significant individually or jointly. 
 
ORIGINAL BASELINE 
Figure 7: Average component interaction effect using original baselines 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals built with clustered standard errors. Results in Figure 4 using the baseline if Figure 1. It 
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